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Glossolalia (“speaking in tongues”) is a rhythmic utterance of pseudo-words without
consistent semantic meaning and syntactic regularities. Although glossolalia is a
culturally embedded religious activity, its connection with psychopathology (e.g.,
psychotic thought disorder and altered mental state attribution/mentalization) is still
a matter of debate. To elucidate this issue, we investigated 32 glossolalists, 32
matched control participants, and 32 patients with schizophrenia using the Animated
Triangle Test (ATT) and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET). The ATT
can detect hypo- and hypermentalization using animations of two moving triangles.
Healthy adults describe these as random movements (e.g., bouncing), willed actions
(e.g., playing), or they mentalize (e.g., tricking). We found that glossolalists provided
more mentalizing descriptions in the ATT random and intentional movement animations
relative to the control participants. They also recognized more mental states in
the RMET than the controls. None of them had a diagnosis of mental disorders.
In contrast, patients with schizophrenia hypermentalized only in the ATT random
movement condition, whereas they showed hypomentalization in the ATT intentional
movement condition and in the RMET relative the control subjects. Hypermentalization
in the ATT positively correlated with intrinsic religiosity in the glossolalia group. In
conclusion, our results demonstrated a substantial difference in the mentalizing ability
of glossolalists (generalized hypermentalization) and patients with schizophrenia (both
hypo- and hypermentalization).
Keywords: glossolalia, schizophrenia, mentalization, Animated Triangle Test, Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test,
spirituality
INTRODUCTION
Glossolalia is a poetic-rhythmic utterance of pseudo-words without constant semantics and syntax.
It is regularly produced in a religious and spiritual context with particular reference to charismatic
Christian and Pentecostal communities (Goodman, 1972; Mills, 1986; Holm, 1991; Cartledge,
2002). The term glossolalia stems from a Greek phrase used in the Acts and 1 Corinthians in the
New Testament [γλωσσoλαλíα, glossa (tongue or language) and laleo (speak or talk), “speaking
in tongues”]. The default cultural interpretation of this phenomenon delineates a “heavenly
language of the spirit” accessible only to the gifted ones. Glossolalists often report an intentional
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or spontaneous suspension of will to convey divine messages
and prophecies. They tend to perceive an external locus of
control, a conviction that extrapersonal forces possess control
over their life (Coulson and Johnson, 1977). These experiences
are a part of intrinsic religiosity, which characterizes religious
motivation and commitment (e.g., the personal experience of
a divine, supernatural, or higher power; religious beliefs as a
fundamental and a holistic approach to life; carrying religion over
into all other dealings) (Koenig et al., 1997; Hood et al., 2009;
Koenig and Büssing, 2010).
In a seminal cross-cultural study, Samarin (1972)
demonstrated that glossolalic speech is not a random and
disorganized production of sounds: it is characterized by specific
accent, intonation, and word-like and sentence-like units
consisting of syllables, consonants, and vowels, which are not
radically different from the original language of the speaker
(De Peza, 1996). Glossolalia is a collectively accepted form of
religious activity in contrast to language anomalies outside a
cultural context (Chouiter and Annoni, 2018).
Three broad hypotheses are attempting to explain the origin
and causes of glossolalia, emphasizing its relationship with
psychopathology (i.e., disorganized thinking and speech in
psychotic disorders) (Cutten, 1927; Goodman, 1973; Samarin,
1973; Spencer, 1975; Brende and Rinsley, 1979; Hempel et al.,
2002; Francis and Robbins, 2003; Reeves et al., 2014), altered
states of consciousness (Goodman, 1972; Kavan, 2004), and
social learning (Kildahl, 1972; Malony and Lovekin, 1985;
Spanos et al., 1986; Koic et al., 2005; Johnson, 2010).
Despite initial research linking glossolalia to schizophrenia,
mood disorders, and dissociative disorders (Cutten, 1927;
Goodman, 1973; Samarin, 1973; Spencer, 1975; Brende and
Rinsley, 1979; Hempel et al., 2002; Francis and Robbins,
2003; Reeves et al., 2014), there is scarce and inconsistent
evidence that socially embedded glossolalia is an abnormal
phenomenon (Castelein, 1984; Grady and Loewenthal, 1997;
Johnson, 2010). For example, it has been shown that schizophasia
(grossly disorganized and incoherent speech in schizophrenia
and other psychotic disorders) is linguistically distinguishable
from glossolalia (Samarin, 1973). Also, glossolalists seem to
display lower rates of depression (Spanos and Hewitt, 1979),
less neuroticism, and higher emotional stability as compared
to non-glossolalists with a similar cultural and religious
background (Francis and Robbins, 2003), which is against the
psychopathology hypothesis.
However, social cognitive functions have not been compared
in glossolalia and psychotic disorders. The assessment of
theory of mind (ToM) and mentalization (the attribution of
mental states, including intentions, beliefs, desires, and complex
social emotions) is of particular relevance (Carruthers and
Smith, 1996; Bateman and Fonagy, 2010). Experiencing the
presence of a higher power and conveying divine messages are
imaginative, symbolic, and culturally meaningful acts, requiring
the attribution of mental states to invisible agents (gods,
ghosts, angels, and other culturally embedded spiritual actors)
(Boyer, 2001; Newberg et al., 2002, 2006; Schjoedt et al., 2009).
Heightened mentalizing activity may be a cornerstone of religious
and spiritual cognition, which may be enhanced in individuals
practicing glossolalia who experience direct access into the
mental states of imaginary beings.
Concerning the psychopathological model of glossolalia,
it is notable that altered mentalization is a well-replicated
feature of schizophrenia (Abu-Akel and Bailey, 2000; Frith,
2004; Brune, 2005; Bora and Pantelis, 2013; Bliksted et al.,
2016, 2019; Martinez et al., 2019). Some patients exhibit a
weakened attribution of mental states (hypomentalization),
resulting in social isolation and inflexible communication, which
is reminiscent of that seen in individuals with autism-spectrum
disorders (Martinez et al., 2019). Hypomentalization is also
related to formal thought disorder and impaired comprehension
with a particular reference to clause embedding (Cokal et al.,
2019). However, patients with schizophrenia also tend to
interpret neutral and random social interactions as if they
were driven by intentional agents (hypermentalizing), which
may lead to altered causal attribution and abnormal belief
formation (Abu-Akel and Bailey, 2000; Frith, 2004). Under
the circumstances characterized by stress, social threat, and
anomalous perceptual experiences, hypermentalization may form
the basis for paranoid ideas (Freeman and Garety, 2014; Ballespi
et al., 2019). Intriguingly, hypo- and hypermentalization can
simultaneously occur in the same patient who experiences social
difficulties, impaired language comprehension, and paranoid
thoughts at the same time (Bliksted et al., 2016, 2019). Thus,
inadequate hypermentalization is a possible common feature of
schizophrenia and glossolalia, resulting in different cognitive and
behavioral outcomes.
The purpose of the present study was to compare
mentalization in individuals with glossolalia and patients
with schizophrenia by using the Animated Triangle Test (ATT)
(Abell et al., 2000; Castelli et al., 2000, 2002; Martinez et al.,
2019). This test is suitable for the detection of both hypo-
and hypermentalization by implementing animations of two
triangles that move around the screen (Figure 1). Healthy adults
describe the actions of the triangles as random movements
(e.g., bouncing or wandering), goal-directed willed actions (e.g.,
fighting or playing), or observers mentalize and attribute mental
states to the triangles (e.g., tricking or wanting to hide). In
hypomentalization, there are fewer mentalizing descriptions,
whereas, in hypermentalization, observers attribute mental
states even to random movements (Eddy and Cavanna, 2015;
Bliksted et al., 2019). We also used the Reading the Mind in the
Eyes Test (RMET), which assesses mentalization driven by the
recognition of complex social emotions from facial expression
(eye-regions depicted in photographs) (Baron-Cohen et al.,
2001). The Social Cognition Psychometric Evaluation (SCOPE)
project recommended the application of the RMET because
of its practical features in clinical settings, acceptable internal
consistency, good criterion validity, and its correlation with
rehabilitation outcome (Pinkham et al., 2016, 2018).
We hypothesized that individuals with glossolalia show
hypermentalization in the absence of mental illness, depressive-
anxious features, or enhanced schizotypal traits. In contrast,
patients with schizophrenia are characterized by both hypo- and
hypermentalization, together with a decreased accuracy in the
description of the ATT animations (Bliksted et al., 2016, 2019).
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the Animated Triangle Test (ATT) showing characteristic Frith-Happé animations and typical mentalizing descriptions. (A) Mother tries to
motivate her child to go outside. (B) Child does not want to go out. (C) Child exploring and playing outside, and mother watches her.
We also hypothesized that hypermentalization is related to the
subjective experience of intrinsic religiosity. We also studied
the association between mentalization and organized/private
religious activity, as measured by the Duke University Religiosity
Index (DUREL) (Koenig et al., 1997; Koenig and Büssing, 2010).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
We recruited 32 glossolalists and 32 control volunteers who did
not practice glossolalia from local Pentecostal and charismatic
communities. The criteria of glossolalia were established
according to Chouiter and Annoni (2018): (1) few or no
recognizable words with semantic meaning except for Biblical
phrases; (2) similar phonemic properties to the language of
the speaker; (3) small phoneme numbers, accelerated speech,
and altered accent; (4) phonetic pulses begin with a consonant,
bars are of equal length, primary accent on the first pulse
of each bar, and sentences with similar lengths; (5) an ability
to speak “tongues” or ordinary language; and (6) absence of
neurological illness.
The third group of participants consisted of 32 outpatients
with schizophrenia who were demographically similar to the
glossolalia and non-glossolalia group, including education,
IQ, social-economic status, and religious activity (Table 1).
The patients were recruited from a large and heterogeneous
outpatient sample at the National Institute of Psychiatry and
Addictions (Budapest, Hungary). The patient group included
highly functioning and clinically stable individuals in order
to minimize the confounding effect of the chronic disease
process. None of the patients received electroconvulsive therapy.
All participants were Hungarian Caucasians. Written informed
consent was obtained from each volunteer. The study was
approved by the National Medical Research Council (ETT-
TUKEB 18814, Budapest, Hungary). All research was performed
following relevant guidelines and regulations.
General Assessment
All participants received the structured clinical interview for
DSM-5 (Diagnosis and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders –
5) disorders to confirm the diagnosis of schizophrenia and to
exclude mental disorders in the glossolalia and non-glossolalia
group (First et al., 2016). None of the participants in the
glossolalia and non-glossolalia group meet the criteria of mental
disorders. In addition to the DSM-5 interview, the following
tools were used to characterize the participants: Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale-IV (WAIS-IV) (Wechsler, 2008), Hollingshead
Four-Factor Index of Socioeconomic Status (SES) (Hollingshead,
1975), Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (HAM-D) (Hamilton,
1960), and the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS)
(Kay et al., 1987) (patients only) (Table 1).
Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings
and Experiences
The Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences (O-
LIFE) assesses schizotypal personality traits (Mason and Claridge,
2006). The self-report questionnaire consists of yes/no items
organized in four subscales: Unusual Experiences (30 items,
positive schizotypy: hallucination-like experiences, perceptual
aberrations, and magical thinking; internal consistency: α = 0.85),
Cognitive Disorganization (24 items, disorganized schizotypy:
loosened associations, poor attention, and decision-making,
social anxiety; internal consistency: α = 0.83), Introvertive
Anhedonia (27 items, negative schizotypy: physical and social
anhedonia, avoidance of intimacy, social withdrawal; internal
consistency: α = 0.77), and Impulsive Non-conformity (23
items, impulsive schizotypy: impulsive, antisocial, eccentric, and
aggressive tendencies; internal consistency: α = 0.70) (Table 1).
Duke University Religiosity Index
The modified DUREL is a self-report measure consisting of
five items (Koenig and Büssing, 2010). The instrument assesses
organized religious activity [one item: attendance of church and
religious gatherings; never (1) – more than once a week (6)], non-
organized religious activity [one item: prayer, meditation, or Bible
study; rarely or never (1) – more than once a day 6)], and intrinsic
(subjective) religiosity [three items: experiencing the Divine in
life, religious beliefs lie behind the whole approach to life, and
carrying religion over into all other dealings in life; definitely not
true (1) – definitely true (5)]. The DUREL exhibited excellent
internal consistency (α = 0.89) (Table 1).
Animated Triangle Test
Participants viewed brief video clips on the computer screen
depicting two triangles (Frith-Happé animations) (Figure 1;
Abell et al., 2000; Castelli et al., 2000, 2002). There were
two conditions. In the random (non-intentional) condition, the
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TABLE 1 | Characteristics of the participants.
Glossolalists Non-glossolalists Patients with
(n = 32) (n = 32) schizophrenia (n = 32)
Gender (male/female) 20/12 20/12 20/12
Age (years) 31.4 (5.1) 32.3 (6.2) 31.9 (4.7)
Education (years) 11.3 (3.6) 11.4 (3.9) 11.0 (4.8)
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – IV 101.2 (10.6) 102.0 (11.0) 99.5 (12.2)
Hollingshead Four Factor Index (socioeconomic status) 32.6 (7.5) 32.4 (8.0) 31.9 (6.3)
Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (normal: 0–7 points) 6.3 (2.4) 6.5 (3.3) 8.2 (7.1)
Oxford-Liverpool Inventory of Feeling And Experiences (O-LIFE)
Unusual experiences (0–12 points) 2.8 (1.6) 2.9 (1.9) 6.8 (2.4)*
Introvertive anhedonia (0–10 points) 2.4 (0.9) 2.2 (1.1) 4.5 (2.6)*
Cognitive disorganization (0–11 points) 4.1 (2.0) 4.4 (1.0) 6.0 (3.0)*
Impulsive non-conformity (0–10 points) 2.5 (0.7) 2.1 (0.8) 3.7 (1.0)*
Duke University Religiosity Index (DUREL)
Organized religious activity (1–5 points) 3.9 (1.5) 3.8 (1.4) 3.4 (2.6)
Non-organized (private) religious activity (1–5 points) 3.1 (1.1) 3.6 (1.5) 3.2 (1.9)
Intrinsic religiosity (1–5 points) 3.4 (1.0) 3.9 (1.4) 3.5 (1.2)
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale
Positive symptoms – – 12.5 (6.8)
Negative symptoms – – 14.1 (7.2)
Generalized symptoms – – 41.1 (13.6)
Antipsychotic medications
Antipsychotic chlorpromazine equivalent dose (mg/day) – – 378.6 (297.0)
Antipsychotic type (second-/first-generation) – – 26/5
Other illness parameters
Duration of illness (years) 4.0 (2.6)
Number of hospitalizations 2.1 (1.5)
Data are mean (standard deviation) except for gender and antipsychotic type. All patients with schizophrenia received stable antipsychotic medications at the time of
testing (olanzapine, quetiapine, risperidone, aripiprazole, zuclopenthixol, and flupenthixol). *Higher O-LIFE values in the schizophrenia group relative to the other two
groups (ps < 0.05).
triangles moved arbitrarily (e.g., bouncing or flotation). In the
intentional condition, the movement of the triangles mimicked
social interactions that made the viewers feel that the triangles
had mental states and influenced each other (e.g., tricking or
playfulness). There were eight animations (four random and
four intentional, duration: 38–41-s each). When an animation
clip terminated, participants reported what they thought was
happening during the short movies. Two behavioral scientists
or psychologists, who were not aware of the aim of the study
and the status of the participants (glossolalists, non-glossolalists,
and schizophrenia), assessed the answers and calculated the
mean scores. There were two aspects of scoring: intentionality
(degree of mental state attribution, range 0–5) and accuracy
(how exact was the description, range 0–3; Castelli et al., 2000,
2002). The inter-rater agreement between the two assessors was
high (intentionality for random animations: κ = 0.79, Z = 4.9,
p < 0.001; intentionality for non-random animations: κ = 0.81,
Z = 9.6, p < 0.001; accuracy for random animations: κ = 0.78,
Z = 4.8, p< 0.001; accuracy for non-random animations: κ = 0.82,
Z = 9.5, p < 0.001).
Reading the Mind in the Eyes
Participants saw 36 photographs depicting eye-regions of faces
of actors and actresses. Each photograph appeared on separate
slides. Eye-regions expressed complex social emotions and
mental states (e.g., playful, terrified, and joking). Without any
time-pressure, participants choose which of four words (one
target and three foils) best described the mental state of the actor
or actress on the photographs. The dependent measure was the
number of correct responses (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001).
Statistical Analysis
We used STATISTICA 13.1 (Tibco, Palo Alto) software package
for data analysis. First, we conducted Kolmogorov–Smirnov
and Levene’s tests to evaluate data distribution and the
homogeneity of variance, respectively. Given that the data were
normally distributed, and the variances were homogeneous
(ps > 0.2), we used parametric statistical tests. Behavioral
measures were entered into analyses of variance (ANOVAs)
to investigate the main effect of group (glossolalia, non-
glossolalia, and schizophrenia), test conditions (random and
intentional movement), and the interaction between the group
and test conditions. The ANOVAs were followed by Tukey’s
Honestly Significant Differences (HSD) post hoc tests. The IQ
and SES were covariates in the ANOVAs. Pearson’s product
moment correlation coefficients were calculated between the
ATT/RMET data and the demographic and clinical parameters.
Correlation analyses were also corrected for IQ and SES (partial
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correlations). Multiple regression analyses were conducted to
determine the predictors of religiosity. Demographic parameters
were compared with one-way ANOVAs, Student’s t-tests (two-
tailed), and chi-square tests. The level of statistical significance
was set at alpha <0.05 (corrected for multiple comparisons with
the Benjamini–Hochberg method).
RESULTS
Performance on the ATT
First, we compared the ATT performance (attribution of
intentionality to the stimuli) of glossolalists, patients with
schizophrenia, and matched control subjects (Table 1). The
ANOVA conducted on the ATT scores revealed a significant
main effect of group [F(2,93) = 20.44, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.31],
test condition [random vs. intentional) (F(1,93) = 401.63,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.81], and a two-way interaction between
group and test condition [F(2,93) = 12.34, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.21]. Individuals practicing glossolalia detected more
intentionality in the random and intentional animations than
the non-glossolalia control subjects (ps < 0.05) (Figure 2A).
Patients with schizophrenia also scored above the control
participants in the random animations (p < 0.05), but in
the intentional movement animations, they achieved a lower
score relative to the controls (p < 0.01). Finally, a head-
to-head comparison between individuals with glossolalia and
patients with schizophrenia indicated no significant difference
in the random condition (p > 0.1), whereas, in the intentional
movement animations, the patients performed worse than the
glossolalia group (p < 0.001) (Figure 2A). The above-described
results remained the same when IQ and SES were included in the
analysis as covariates.
Accuracy on the ATT
When we analyzed the accuracy of the descriptions related to
the ATT animations, we found significant main effects of group
[F(2,93) = 12.02, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.21] and test condition
(random vs. intentional) [F(1,93) = 27.9, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.23).
The two-way interaction between group and condition did
not reach the level of statistical significance (p > 0.1). There
were no significant differences between the glossolalia and the
non-glossolalia group (p > 0.5). In contrast, patients with
schizophrenia were less accurate than glossolalists and control
participants in all conditions (p < 0.05) (Figure 2B). The results
of the accuracy analysis were the same when IQ and SES were
included as covariates.
Performance on the RMET
Regarding mentalization related to the recognition of complex
social emotions, the ANOVA performed on the RMET scores
indicated a significant main effect of group [F(2,93) = 20.80,
p< 0.001, η2 = 0.31]. Tukey’s HSD tests revealed that glossolalists
outperformed controls [M (control) = 23.6, SD = 4.9; M
FIGURE 2 | Results from the Animated Triangle Test (ATT) (A - intentionality and B - accuracy). The graphs show mean values, the error bars indicate 95%
confidence intervals. aControls < Schizophrenia < Glossolalia; bSchizophrenia < Controls < Glossolalia (ps < 0.05); cSchizophrenia < Controls = Glossolalia (all
significant differences at ps < 0.05, Tukey’s HSD tests).
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FIGURE 3 | Correlations between intrinsic religiosity and intentionality attributed to random movements (r = 0.71, p < 0.01) and intentional movements (r = 0.65,
p < 0.01) on the Animated Triangle Test (ATT). Dotted lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. The graphs on the top and on the right indicate the distribution of ATT
scores and intrinsic religiosity scores, respectively.
(glossolalia) = 26.2, SD = 4.2; p < 0.05] and patients with
schizophrenia [M (schizophrenia) = 19.1, SD = 4.3; p < 0.001]
who were impaired relative to the control group (p < 0.001).
Relationship Between Mentalization and
Religiosity
In the glossolalia group, higher scores on the ATT random
and intentional conditions were associated with higher
DUREL intrinsic religiosity scores [r(random) = 0.71,
r(intentional) = 0.65, ps < 0.01) (Figure 3]. Both random
and intentional ATT values predicted intrinsic religiosity
(random: b∗ = 0.51, t(29) = 3.76, p < 0.01; intentional:
b∗ = 0.39, t(29) = 2.88, p < 0.05), altogether explaining the
58.1% of the variance in the DUREL intrinsic religiosity score
[F(2,29) = 22.52, p < 0.001]. In the other two groups, we
found no significant relationships between ATT and DUREL
scores. There were no significant correlations between ATT
and DUREL organized/personal religiosity scores in either
group. The RMET did not correlate with the DUREL scores
(organizational, private, and intrinsic components) in either
group (−0.3 < rs < 0.3, ps > 0.1).
DISCUSSION
Our results confirmed the hypothesis that glossolalists display
hypermentalization. Specifically, they more frequently attributed
intentions to randomly moving objects on the ATT as
compared to non-glossolalists with similar demographic and
religious features. In this respect, glossolalists and patients
with schizophrenia were similar. However, individuals practicing
glossolalia were also highly sensitive to intentionality when
the animated objects interacted with each other to mimic
social behavior in the ATT. Glossolalists also recognized
more complex mental states in the RMET than the controls.
General hypermentalization is a critical feature that distinguished
glossolalists from patients with schizophrenia who achieved
lower scores on the ATT intentional condition and the on
RMET relative to the control volunteers. In other words, patients
with schizophrenia showed hypomentalization in the ATT
intentional condition and in the recognition of facial expression
of complex mental states, whereas glossolalists hypermentalized
in all test conditions.
The hypermentalizing feature of schizophrenia was
inadequate and possibly maladaptive because the patients
exclusively interpreted random movements as if these were
intentional: they detected social salience in a non-salient
situation (Kapur, 2003). In glossolalia, however, we also observed
enhanced mentalizing sensitivity in the intentional condition,
which may be an adaptive feature. For the interpretation of
the results, it is essential to emphasize that the differences
summarized above were demonstrated in groups similar in
demographic features and religiosity, which may have an impact
on mentalization. IQ and SES did not explain group differences
because the groups did not differ in these measures, and the
results remained the same when these parameters were included
as covariates in the statistical analyses.
Beyond the characterization of mentalization, an important
finding of our study is that individuals with glossolalia did not
meet the criteria of DSM-5 disorders, and their depression,
anxiety, and schizotypy scores did not differ from the values of the
non-glossolalist volunteers. Therefore, our results are against the
hypothesis that glossolalia is a consequence of psychopathology
(Cutten, 1927; Goodman, 1973; Samarin, 1973; Spencer, 1975;
Brende and Rinsley, 1979; Hempel et al., 2002; Francis and
Robbins, 2003; Reeves et al., 2014). However, we did not
conduct a detailed personality assessment, and we cannot make
a conclusion on individual differences between glossolalists and
non-glossolalists. The relationship between psychopathology and
glossolalia should be explored in a larger representative sample.
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From a broader perspective, our findings provide further
evidence that enhanced mentalization is an essential component
of religious and spiritual cognition. The leading cognitive
theory of religion focuses on the concept of hyperactive agent
detection device (HADD) as an evolutionary ancient mental
faculty serving social cognition (Barrett, 2000; Boyer, 2001;
Atran, 2002). According to the HADD model, humans are
hardwired to impute intentions in salient situations. These
situations do not necessarily include human beings and animate
things: mental states and intentions can be attributed to
inanimate objects and physical forces. People attribute magical
causes to existential, natural, economic, and political events
to create meaning and understanding (e.g., richness, health,
and blooming are presents, whereas war, illness, and disaster
are punishment from gods, spirits, devil, and other higher
powers) (Barrett, 2000; Boyer, 2001; Atran, 2002). In adolescents
with autism-spectrum conditions, neurotypical student samples,
and Canadian and American national samples, Norenzayan
et al. (2012) demonstrated a link between autistic traits and
reduced belief in God, and mentalizing capacities mediated
this relationship. It is notable that the authors controlled the
mediation analysis for well-known personality features related
to religiosity (systemizing, conscientiousness, and agreeableness)
(Norenzayan et al., 2012). However, subsequent studies failed to
demonstrate a significant relationship between mentalization and
religious belief, and emphasized other potential mediators (e.g.,
core ontological confusions, moral concern, analytical thinking,
and credibility enhancing displays) (Lindeman et al., 2015). These
results challenge the theoretical view that enhanced perception
of agency can explain the emergence of religious and spiritual
beliefs. In the present study, we could refine this hypothesis
by demonstrating a specific relationship between glossolalia and
hypermentalizing. Moreover, increased mentalization, primarily
when intentionality was attributed to random movements,
was associated with intrinsic religiosity, which includes the
feeling of immersion in the thoughts, plans, and intentions
of supernatural beings. Therefore, agency detection may be
related to a circumscribed aspect of religious cognition (i.e.,
the experience of contact and communication with supernatural
beings) and not to religious beliefs in general.
The present study is not without limitations, and our
initial results on glossolalia and social cognition raise several
questions for future studies. First, the sample size was small,
and the study was underpowered. This limitation is explained
by the uniqueness and rarity of the sample. Individuals with
glossolalia are often reluctant to participate in research studies.
Therefore, the study must be replicated and extended in a
large and representative sample. Second, it is unclear how
specific linguistic features are related to mentalization. This issue
necessitates a multifaceted assessment of mental state attribution
with both visual and verbal tests, together with the linguistic
analysis of glossolalic speech. Third, we used only two tests
to measure mentalization, which is a complex psychological
construct comprising distinct components. Moreover, the
impact of enhanced mentalization on daily functioning and
quality of life should be elucidated. The ecological validity
of these experimental procedures is not clearly understood
(Byom and Mutlu, 2013). Forth, the present study failed to
address the putative link between mentalization and personality
traits, which is crucial to better understand the interplay
among religiosity, spirituality, individual differences, and social-
cognitive mechanisms.
Furthermore, the issue of culture, gender, race, ethnicity,
social-economic status, and other demographic measures are of
prominent importance in glossolalia research. In this respect,
the critical feature of the present study was that we assessed a
culturally, racially, and ethnically homogeneous population. All
participants were Caucasian with Hungarian origin. Therefore,
our data do not add new information regarding the diversity of
ethnocultural context of glossolalia.
When interpreting the present results, a potential selection
bias must be taken into consideration. Specifically, it seems to
be evident that patients with schizophrenia, who experience
a potentially deteriorating course of illness, display a poor
performance on mentalization tasks as compared to glossolalists
and controls without a mental disorder. However, we selected
highly functioning outpatients who were not statistically
different in education, IQ, social-economic status, and religiosity
concerning the other two study groups. We observed mild
negative symptoms in our schizophrenia sample (14.1 points
on a 7–49 points negative symptom scale of PANSS; average
rating for the seven symptoms: minimal, questionable, and
subtle pathology, or the extreme end of the normal range; Kay
et al., 1987). Also, patients with schizophrenia did not show a
generalized impairment on the mentalization tests: in the ATT
random movement condition, they outperformed the healthy
control group. The second source of bias is that glossolalists
were not recruited from the general community. Therefore, the
results should be replicated and extended in a larger and less
specific sample.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, culturally embedded glossolalia in religious
settings can be present in the absence of profound
psychopathology. Glossolalists exhibit generally enhanced
mentalization, which is different from patients with
schizophrenia who display a double pattern of hypo- and
hypermentalization. Therefore, it has not been justified
that glossolalia can be viewed as a form or a symptom of
mental disorders.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The datasets generated for this study are available on request to
the corresponding author.
ETHICS STATEMENT
The studies involving human participants were reviewed
and approved by the National Medical Research
Council (ETT-TUKEB 18814, Budapest, Hungary). The
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 April 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 638
fpsyg-11-00638 April 10, 2020 Time: 17:58 # 8
Kéri et al. Glossolalia and Schizophrenia
patients/participants provided their written informed consent to
participate in this study.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
SK coordinated data collection and measurements, and wrote the
first draft of the manuscript. SK and KC analyzed the data. IK
performed the revision of the manuscript. All authors designed
the study, reviewed and edited the final version of the manuscript,
and approved the manuscript for publication.
FUNDING
This work was supported by the BME-Biotechnology FIKP
grant of EMMI (BME FIKP-BIO), and the National Research,
Development and Innovation Office (NKFI/OTKA K 128599).
REFERENCES
Abell, F., Happé, F., and Frith, U. (2000). Do triangles play tricks? Attribution of
mental states to animated shapes in normal and abnormal development. Cogn.
Dev. 15, 1–16. doi: 10.1016/s0885-2014(00)00014-9
Abu-Akel, A., and Bailey, A. L. (2000). The possibility of different forms of theory
of mind impairment in psychiatric and developmental disorders. Psychol. Med.
30, 735–738.
Atran, S. (2002). In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Ballespi, S., Vives, J., Sharp, C., Tobar, A., and Barrantes-Vidal, N. (2019).
Hypermentalizing in social anxiety: evidence for a context-dependent
relationship. Front. Psychol. 10:1501. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.01501
Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., Hill, J., Raste, Y., and Plumb, I. (2001). The
“Reading the mind in the eyes” test revised version: a study with normal
adults, and adults with Asperger syndrome or high-functioning autism. J. Child
Psychol. Psychiatry 42, 241–251. doi: 10.1111/1469-7610.00715
Barrett, J. L. (2000). Exploring the natural foundations of religion. Trends Cogn.
Sci. 4, 29–34. doi: 10.1016/s1364-6613(99)01419-9
Bateman, A., and Fonagy, P. (2010). Mentalization based treatment for borderline
personality disorder. World Psychiatry 9, 11–15.
Bliksted, V., Frith, C., Videbech, P., Fagerlund, B., Emborg, C., Simonsen, A.,
et al. (2019). Hyper- and hypomentalizing in patients with first-episode
schizophrenia: fMRI and behavioral studies. Schizophr. Bull. 45, 377–385. doi:
10.1093/schbul/sby027
Bliksted, V., Ubukata, S., and Koelkebeck, K. (2016). Discriminating autism
spectrum disorders from schizophrenia by investigation of mental state
attribution on an on-line mentalizing task: a review and meta-analysis.
Schizophr. Res. 171, 16–26. doi: 10.1016/j.schres.2016.01.037
Bora, E., and Pantelis, C. (2013). Theory of mind impairments in first-episode
psychosis, individuals at ultra-high risk for psychosis and in first-degree
relatives of schizophrenia: systematic review and meta-analysis. Schizophr. Res.
144, 31–36. doi: 10.1016/j.schres.2012.12.013
Boyer, P. (2001). Religion Explained. London: Heineman.
Brende, J. O., and Rinsley, D. B. (1979). Borderline disorder, altered states of
consciousness, and glossolalia. J. Am. Acad. Psychoanal. 7, 165–188. doi: 10.
1521/jaap.1.1979.7.2.165
Brune, M. (2005). “Theory of mind” in schizophrenia: a review of the literature.
Schizophr. Bull. 31, 21–42. doi: 10.1093/schbul/sbi002
Byom, L. J., and Mutlu, B. (2013). Theory of mind: mechanisms, methods, and new
directions. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:413. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2013.00413
Carruthers, P., and Smith, P. K. (1996). Theories of Theory of Mind. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Cartledge, M. J. (2002). Charismatic Glossolalia: An Empirical-Theological Study.
London: Routledge.
Castelein, J. D. (1984). Glossolalia and the psychology of the self and narcissism.
J. Relig. Health 23, 47–62. doi: 10.1007/BF00999899
Castelli, F., Frith, C., Happe, F., and Frith, U. (2002). Autism, Asperger syndrome
and brain mechanisms for the attribution of mental states to animated shapes.
Brain 125, 1839–1849. doi: 10.1093/brain/awf189
Castelli, F., Happe, F., Frith, U., and Frith, C. (2000). Movement and mind:
a functional imaging study of perception and interpretation of complex
intentional movement patterns. Neuroimage 12, 314–325. doi: 10.1006/nimg.
2000.0612
Chouiter, L., and Annoni, J. M. (2018). Glossolalia and aphasia: related but different
worlds. Front. Neurol. Neurosci. 42, 96–105. doi: 10.1159/000475694
Cokal, D., Zimmerer, V., Varley, R., Watson, S., and Hinzen, W. (2019).
Comprehension of embedded clauses in schizophrenia with and without
formal thought disorder. J. Nerv. Ment. Dis. 207, 384–392. doi: 10.1097/NMD.
0000000000000981
Coulson, J. E., and Johnson, R. W. (1977). Glossolalia and internal-external
locus of control. J. Psychol. Theol. 5, 312–317. doi: 10.1177/00916471770050
0405
Cutten, B. (1927). Speaking with Tongues: Historically and Psychologically
Considered. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
De Peza, H. A. G. (1996). Glossolalia in the Spiritual Baptist Faith: A Linguistic
Study. Saint Augustine, FL: University of the West Indies.
Eddy, C. M., and Cavanna, A. E. (2015). Triangles, tricks and tics: hyper-
mentalizing in response to animated shapes in Tourette syndrome. Cortex 71,
68–75. doi: 10.1016/j.cortex.2015.06.003
First, M. B., Williams, J. B. W., Karg, R. S., and Spitzer, R. L. (2016). Structured
Clinical Interview for DSM-5 Disorders—Clinician Version (SCID-5-CV).
Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association Publishing.
Francis, R. J., and Robbins, M. (2003). Personality and glossolalia: a study among
male Evangelical clergy. Pastoral Psychol. 51, 391–396.
Freeman, D., and Garety, P. (2014). Advances in understanding and treating
persecutory delusions: a review. Soc. Psychiatry Psychiatr. Epidemiol. 49, 1179–
1189. doi: 10.1007/s00127-014-0928-7
Frith, C. D. (2004). Schizophrenia and theory of mind. Psychol. Med. 34, 385–389.
Goodman, F. D. (1972). Speaking in Tongues: A Cross-Cultural Study of Glossolalia.
Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
Goodman, F. D. (1973). Glossolalia and hallucination in Pentecostal
congregations. Psychiatr. Clin. (Basel) 6, 97–103. doi: 10.1159/00028
3267
Grady, B., and Loewenthal, K. M. (1997). Features associated with speaking in
tongues (glossolalia). Br. J. Med. Psychol. 70(Pt 2), 185–191. doi: 10.1111/j.
2044-8341.1997.tb01898.x
Hamilton, M. (1960). A rating scale for depression. J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry
23, 56–62.
Hempel, A. G., Meloy, J. R., Stern, R., Ozone, S. J., and Gray, B. T. (2002).
Fiery tongues and mystical motivations: glossolalia in a forensic population
is associated with mania and sexual/religious delusions. J. Forensic Sci. 47,
305–312.
Hollingshead, A. A. (1975). Four-Factor Index of Social Status. New Haven, CT: Yale
University.
Holm, N. G. (1991). Pentecostalism: conversion and charismata. Int. J. Psychol.
Relig. 1, 135–151. doi: 10.1207/s15327582ijpr0103_1
Hood, R. W., Hill, P. C., and Spilka, B. (2009). The Psychology of Religion: An
Empirical Approach, 4th Edn. New York, NY: Guilford.
Johnson, K. D. (2010). A neuropastoral care and counseling assessment of
glossolalia: a theosocial cognitive study. J. Health Care Chaplain 16, 161–171.
doi: 10.1080/08854726.2010.492698
Kapur, S. (2003). Psychosis as a state of aberrant salience: a framework linking
biology, phenomenology, and pharmacology in schizophrenia. Am. J. Psychiatry
160, 13–23. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.160.1.13
Kavan, H. (2004). Glossolalia and altered states of consciousnessin two
New Zealand religious movements. J. Contemp. Relig. 19, 171–184. doi: 10.
1080/1353790042000207692
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 April 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 638
fpsyg-11-00638 April 10, 2020 Time: 17:58 # 9
Kéri et al. Glossolalia and Schizophrenia
Kay, S. R., Fiszbein, A., and Opler, L. A. (1987). The positive and negative syndrome
scale (PANSS) for schizophrenia. Schizophr. Bull. 13, 261–276. doi: 10.1093/
schbul/13.2.261
Kildahl, J. P. (1972). The Psychology of Speaking in Tongues. New York, NY: Harper
& Row.
Koenig, H., Parkerson, G. R. Jr., and Meador, K. G. (1997). Religion index for
psychiatric research. Am. J. Psychiatry 154, 885–886.
Koenig, H. G., and Büssing, A. (2010). The Duke University Religion Index
(DUREL): a five-item measure for use in epidemological studies. Religions 1,
78–85. doi: 10.3390/rel1010078
Koic, E., Filakovic, P., Nad, S., and Celic, I. (2005). Glossolalia. Coll. Antropol. 29,
373–379.
Lindeman, M., Svedholm-Häkkinen, A. M., and Lipsanen, J. (2015). Ontological
confusions but not mentalizing abilities predict religious belief, paranormal
belief, and belief in supernatural purpose. Cognition 134, 63–76. doi: 10.1016/j.
cognition.2014.09.008
Malony, H. N., and Lovekin, A. A. (1985). Glossolalia: Behavioral Science
Perspectives on Speaking in Tongues. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Martinez, G., Mosconi, E., Daban-Huard, C., Parellada, M., Fananas, L., Gaillard,
R., et al. (2019). “A circle and a triangle dancing together”: alteration of social
cognition in schizophrenia compared to autism spectrum disorders. Schizophr.
Res. 210, 94–100. doi: 10.1016/j.schres.2019.05.043
Mason, O., and Claridge, G. (2006). The Oxford-liverpool inventory of feelings and
experiences (O-LIFE): further description and extended norms. Schizophr. Res.
82, 203–211. doi: 10.1016/j.schres.2005.12.845
Mills, W. E. (1986). Speaking in Tounges: A Guide to Research on Glossolalia. Grand
Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans.
Newberg, A. B., D’aquili, E., and Rause, V. (2002). Why God Won’t Go Away. Brain
Science and the Biology of Belief. New York, NY: Ballantine Books.
Newberg, A. B., Wintering, N. A., Morgan, D., and Waldman, M. R. (2006). The
measurement of regional cerebral blood flow during glossolalia: a preliminary
SPECT study. Psychiatry Res. 148, 67–71. doi: 10.1016/j.pscychresns.2006.
07.001
Norenzayan, A., Gervais, W. M., and Trzesniewski, K. H. (2012). Mentalizing
deficits constrain belief in a personal God. PLoS One 7:e36880. doi: 10.1371/
journal.pone.0036880
Pinkham, A. E., Harvey, P. D., and Penn, D. L. (2018). Social cognition
psychometric evaluation: results of the final validation study. Schizophr. Bull.
44, 737–748. doi: 10.1093/schbul/sbx117
Pinkham, A. E., Penn, D. L., Green, M. F., and Harvey, P. D. (2016). Social
cognition psychometric evaluation: results of the initial psychometric study.
Schizophr. Bull. 42, 494–504. doi: 10.1093/schbul/sbv056
Reeves, R. R., Kose, S., and Abubakr, A. (2014). Temporal lobe discharges and
glossolalia. Neurocase 20, 236–240. doi: 10.1080/13554794.2013.770874
Samarin, W. J. (1972). Tongues of Men and Angels: The Religious Language of
Pentecostalism. New York, NY: Macmillan.
Samarin, W. J. (1973). Glossolalia as regressive speech. Lang. Speech 16, 77–89.
doi: 10.1177/002383097301600108
Schjoedt, U., Stodkilde-Jorgensen, H., Geertz, A. W., and Roepstorff, A. (2009).
Highly religious participants recruit areas of social cognition in personal prayer.
Soc. Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. 4, 199–207. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsn050
Spanos, N. P., Cross, W. P., Lepage, M., and Coristine, M. (1986). Glossolalia
as learned behavior: an experimental demonstration. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 95,
21–23. doi: 10.1037/0021-843x.95.1.21
Spanos, N. P., and Hewitt, N. C. (1979). Glossolalia: a test of trance and
psychopathology hypotheses. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 88, 427–434. doi: 10.1037/
0021-843x.88.4.427
Spencer, J. (1975). The mental health of Jehova’s witnesses. Br. J. Psychiatry 125,
556–559. doi: 10.1192/bjp.126.6.556
Wechsler, D. (2008). Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, 4th Edn. San Antonio, TX:
Pearson.
Conflict of Interest: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the
absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a
potential conflict of interest.
Copyright © 2020 Kéri, Kállai and Csigó. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use,
distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication
in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 April 2020 | Volume 11 | Article 638
